From CFACT

Read the full Supreme Court Decision at CFACT.org

“This is a significant victory for states’ sovereignty and the rule of law. This plan, if implemented, would have imposed undue regulatory burdens on states – and the EPA doesn’t have the power to do that… We are committed to defending the prerogatives of states against federal encroachment.”  Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost

From Nick Pope at Daily Caller

The Supreme Court temporarily blocked an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plan to limit ozone pollution that drifts across state lines on Thursday.

The court ruled to temporarily block the EPA’s “good neighbor” rule for ozone, which the agency originally intended to impose on 23 states via complex regulatory processes. The stay will remain in place as litigation over the rule plays out in lower courts.

The court decided to block the rule by a 5-4 vote, with Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Sonia Sotomayor, Ketanji Brown Jackson, and Elana Kagan dissenting. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the court’s opinion and was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito.

Read the full Supreme Court Decision at CFACT.org

Supreme Court Syllabus / Summary:

The Clean Air Act envisions a collaborative effort between States and the
federal government to regulate air quality. When the Environmental
Protection Agency sets standards for common air pollutants, States
must submit a State Implementation Plan, or SIP, providing for the
“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of those standards
in their jurisdictions. See 42 U. S. C. §7410(a)(1). Because air currents
can carry pollution across state borders, States must also design their
plans with neighboring States in mind. Under the Act’s “Good Neigh-
bor Provision,” state plans must prohibit emissions “in amounts which
will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State” of the relevant air-quality standard.
§7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Only if a SIP fails to satisfy the “applicable re-
quirements” of the Act may EPA issue a Federal Implementation Plan,
or FIP, for the noncompliant State that fails to correct the deficiencies
in its SIP. §§7410(k)(3), (c)(1).

In 2015, EPA revised its air-quality standards for ozone, thus trig-
gering a requirement for States to submit new SIPs. Years later, EPA
announced its intention to disapprove over 20 SIPs because the agency
believed they had failed to address adequately obligations under the
Good Neighbor Provision. During the public-comment period for the
proposed SIP disapprovals, EPA issued a single proposed FIP to bind all those States. EPA designed its proposed FIP based on which emissions-control measures would maximize cost-effectiveness in improving ozone levels downwind and on the assumption the FIP would apply to all covered States. Commenters warned that the proposed SIP disapprovals were flawed and that a failure to achieve all the SIP disapprovals as EPA envisioned would mean that EPA would need to reassess the measures necessary to maximize cost-effective ozone-level improvements in light of a different set of States. EPA proceeded to issue its final FIP without addressing this concern. Instead, EPA announced that its plan was severable: Should any jurisdiction drop out,
the plan would continue to apply unchanged to the remaining jurisdictions. Ongoing litigation over the SIP disapprovals soon vindicated at least some of the commenters’ concerns. Courts stayed 12 of the SIP disapprovals, which meant EPA could not apply its FIP to those States. A number of the remaining States and industry groups challenged the FIP in the D. C. Circuit. They argued that EPA’s decision to apply the FIP after so many other States had dropped out was “arbitrary” or “capricious,” and they asked the court to stay any effort to enforce the FIP against them while their appeal unfolded. The D.C. Circuit denied relief, and the parties renewed their request in this Court.
Held: The applications for a stay are granted; enforcement of EPA’s rule
against the applicants shall be stayed pending the disposition of the
applicants’ petition for review in the D. C. Circuit and any petition for
writ of certiorari, timely sought. Pp. 9–20.
(a) When deciding an application for a stay, the Court asks (1)
whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it
will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceedings,
and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418,
434. When States and other parties seek to stay the enforcement of a
federal regulation against them, often “the harms and equities [will
be] very weighty on both sides.” Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___
(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant of stay). Because that is true
here, resolution of applicants’ stay request ultimately turns on the first
question: Who is likely to prevail at the end. See Nken, 556 U. S., at
434. Pp. 9–11.
(b) Applicants are likely to prevail on their arbitrary-or-capricious
claim. An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “capricious” if it is
not “reasonable and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio
Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423. Thus, the agency must offer “a satisfactory
explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made” and cannot simply ignore “an im-
portant aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43

EPA’s plan rested on an assumption that all the upwind States would
adopt emissions-reduction measures up to a uniform level of costs to
the point of diminishing returns. Commenters posed their concerns
that if upwind States fell out of the planned FIP, the point at which
emissions-control measures maximize cost-effective downwind air-
quality improvements might shift. To this question, EPA offered no
reasoned response. As a result, the applicants are likely to prevail on
their argument that EPA’s final rule was not “reasonably explained,”
Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U. S., at 423, and that it instead ignored “an important aspect of the problem” before it, State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S., at 43. Pp. 11–13.
(c) EPA’s alternative arguments are unavailing. First, EPA argues
that adding a “severability” provision to its final rule—i.e., providing
the FIP would “continue to be implemented” without regard to the
number of States remaining—responded to commenters’ concerns.
But EPA’s response did not address those concerns so much as it side-
stepped them. Nothing in the final rule’s severability provision actually addressed whether and how measures found to maximize cost-effectiveness in achieving downwind ozone air-quality improvements with the participation of all the upwind States remain so when many fewer States might be subject to the agency’s plan. Second, EPA insists that no one raised that concern during the public comment period. The Act’s “reasonable specificity” requirement, however, does not mean a party must rehearse the identical argument made before the agency. Here, EPA had notice of the objection, and its own statements and actions confirm the agency appreciated the concern. Third, EPA argues that applicants must return to EPA and file a motion asking it to reconsider its final rule before presenting their objection in court because the “grounds for [their] objection arose after the period for
public comment.” §7607(d)(7)(B). Nothing requires the applicants to return to EPA to raise (again) a concern EPA already had a chance to address. Pp. 13–17.
Applications for stay granted.
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS ,
C. J., and THOMAS , ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BARRETT , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR , KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined

Read the full Supreme Court Decision at CFACT.org