Tag Archives: COP 28

Will China pay climate change “loss and damage”?

The debate over what China owes to countries that are least responsible for global warming — but most harmed by its effects — had dramatically intensified in the wake of the recent U.N. Climate Change Conference in Egypt. At the end of the two-week summit, known as COP27.

From  CFACT

By David Wojick

I normally despise the bogus issue of “loss and damage,” which is featured in the upcoming COP 28 extravaganza. But for now, I love it because it has squarely raised the long overdue issue of China’s status as a so-called developing country.

The simple issue is, will China pay into the new Loss and Damages Fund? Assuming they ever get it going. It seems obvious they should, and a lot of countries are calling for it, including the US, which might even make it a condition of our participation.

I mean, China is the world’s largest CO2 emitter, right? They produce more electricity than the US, EU, and UK combined, mostly by burning billions of tons of coal a year. What could be simpler?

Well, it turns out to be really complicated, for legal reasons, of all things. COP 28 is the 28th Conference of Parties to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the grand climate treaty that everyone signed onto.

Core to that massive treaty is a division between developed and developing countries. China was dirt poor in 1992, so of course, they are on the developing list. Today, they are the industrial powerhouse of the world, but the list has not been changed.

The Loss and Damage Fund is also under that treaty, so it is supposed to accept money from developed countries and distribute it to developing ones. Thus, there is no provision for China to pay, a point China happily repeats endlessly. So sorry.

The obvious solution is to change the UN climate treaty to reflect reality, but that would be an almost impossible task, especially since any COP member country can veto any change.

In fact, when you look at the list of big CO2-emitting countries, it quickly becomes apparent that we are not just talking about mighty China. Thanks to their wonderful economic progress in the last 20 years, a good number of those developing countries now emit a lot more than some on the developed list.

China is number 1 in CO2 emissions, but India is 3rd, Iran is 8th, Indonesia is 10th, Brazil is 12th, Mexico 13th, and so it goes. Basing who pays on emissions would open a Pandora’s box of impossible wrangling. After all, Denmark is number 70.

The press coverage is hopeless, as usual. This issue gets almost no attention. More broadly, their whole perspective is wrong as they keep saying the next step is to iron out the details. The opposite is true.

UN negotiations always work from the easy issues to the middle ones and, finally, the really hard ones, which is where we are now. Who pays, how much, and to whom are not details. They are the core, make-or-break issues. The issue getting all the attention, whether the World Bank handles the money or a new UN fund, is tiny in comparison.

Another huge press confusion is repeatedly describing loss and damage as rich countries paying for the climate damage they are causing. The greener version is to call it reparations.

There is nothing about causation or liability in the UN text. It reads like an agreement for the developed countries to send aid to the developing ones for a specific cause, namely climate (actually weather) caused losses and damages. This lack of liability language was a requirement for the US and some other developed countries to agree to kick off trying to set up a fund of some sort. If this fund ever gets set up, which is far from clear at this point, I am sure the US will see its contributions as foreign aid. Certainly not a reparations.

In the meantime, the issue of China paying looks pretty impossible. China has said it does not want any of the aid, but that does not resolve the glaring fact they are by far the world’s biggest CO2 emitter.

It is all looking pretty funny at this point, which is just how I like it.

Stay tuned to CFACT as the COP 28 loss and damage fiasco plays out.

Author

David Wojick

David Wojick, Ph.D. is an inDr. David Wojick is an independent policy analyst and senior advisor to CFACT.

As a civil engineer with a Ph.D. in logic and analytic philosophy of science, he brings a unique perspective to complex policy issues.

His specializes in science and technology intensive issues, especially in energy and environment.

As a cognitive scientist he also does basic research on the structure and dynamics of complex issues and reasoning.

This research informs his policy analyses. He has written hundreds of analytical articles. Many recent examples can be found at https://www.cfact.org/author/dwojick/ Often working as a consultant on understanding complex issues, Dr. Wojick’s numerous clients have included think tanks, trade associations, businesses and government agencies.

Examples range from CFACT to the Chief of Naval Research and the Energy Department’s Office of Science.

He has served on the faculty of Carnegie Mellon University and the staff of the Naval Research Laboratory.

He is available for confidential consulting, research and writing.

Green goals fueling hot wars

As the world struggles to battle the effects of climate change, not everyone benefits equally from the remedies. “Who’s going to win? Who’s going to lose as climate changes? 

From CFACT

Decarbonization must become the ‘central organizing principle of human civilization’ – Al Gore

The real reason, says The New York Times, that Israel must accept the murder of 1,500 or so of its citizens and hundreds more held hostage even as rockets and missiles are still being fired by Hamas and a host of Iran-backed free-lancers, comes straight from Al Gore’s lips.

The fighting tempts countries to secure their supplies of oil and gas rather than abandon fossil fuels on the UN’s timetable. The historical echoes, laments the Times, “are chilling, coming 50 years after the Arab oil embargo roiled energy markets.”

Unless Israel surrenders (unspoken but implied), November’s climate negotiations (COP 28) in Doha, United Arab Emirates, will become “even more complicated.” An earlier Times article moaned that “defense stocks have rallied,” and oil producers are making profits.

“This is a fundamental test,” said Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, “of whether nations can firewall climate diplomacy from immediate crises.” But with the talks being held in the UAE petrostate, the deck is heavily stacked against the coveted Net Zero goals.

Dear Gray Lady, you write further that the Hamas-Israel “conflict” follows a global pandemic and comes amid a war in Ukraine that has pummeled economies, driven countries deeper into debt, raised food and fuel prices, and worsened hunger.

Curiously, Your Grayness, you seem to imply that neither the pandemic nor the Russia-Ukraine war threatened climate negotiations – something you apparently join President Biden as deeming far worse than a nuclear holocaust.

But No. You have a simpler solution to the climate apocalypse: If the Israelis would just lay down their weapons, sing Kumbaya with Hamas, and worship Gaia together, the planet will quickly heal.

Reminds me of an old song made popular by Frank Sinatra, “Fairy tales can come true, It can happen to you, If you’re young at heart.” Sadly, for the young in Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Russia, and many other places around the world, the young at heart are being “pummeled.”

Yet the Times’ focus is on the West’s “failure” to share access to Covid vaccines (despite side effects just now being recognized) and provide “sufficient financial aid” to help poor countries “deal with climate hazards.” NOT to share access to fertilizers, infrastructure, electricity, and educational opportunities to bring them out of poverty!

The Times’ clever move to make Israel the bad guy on climate change is a far cry from the tone set in February by both the United Nations Environment Programme and Politico and followed up on in August by Scientific American.

The UNEP reported on preliminary monitoring of the Ukraine conflict during 2021 that pointed to a “toxic legacy for generations to come.” Thousands of possible incidents of air, water, and land pollution and the degradation of ecosystems – including risks to neighboring countries – had already been identified – with more bad news to come. Just chronicling all the damage will be, said UNEP, “a colossal task.” And that’s not including environmental damage in Russia.

The UNEP and its partners have uncovered incidents at nuclear power plants, energy infrastructure (including oil storage tankers), oil and gas facilities, mines, industrial sites, and agro-processing facilities.

Damage to the water supply has occurred at pumping stations, purification plants, and sewage facilities; hazardous substances have been released from explosions at fertilizer and nitric acid plants. All this on top of cleaning up military debris, destroyed housing, and livestock carcasses.

UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen made the shocking statement that “The mapping and initial screening of environmental hazards only serves to confirm that war is quite literally toxic.” Urging an end to the conflict, Andersen added that, “The environment is about people; it’s about livelihoods, public health, clean air and water, and basic food systems.”

Are we to conclude that the Times sees climate change as the only important human concern?

Politico reported in February that nearly 1,100 cases of environmental damage (out of over 2,300 identified) had been handed over to law enforcement agencies as part of an effort to hold Moscow accountable for environmental damage in Ukraine. Eight months ago, Ukraine environment minister Ruslan Strilets estimated the damage at US$51.45 billion.

As Scientific American reported in August, for Ukrainians to return to their homes, the rebuilding – assisted by up to $91.5 million from U.S. taxpayers – will need to include restoring drinking water and sanitation systems and the safe processing of solid waste.

The theme of the article (which reads like a green coalition press release) is, “When it’s time to rebuild, we must prioritize more sustainable and resilient infrastructure in Ukraine.” Might this also mean that Ukrainians all drive zero-emission vehicles and ban fossil fuels immediately as a condition of return?

Of course, none of this damage might have occurred had the Ukrainians followed the Times’ advice (to Israel, not Ukraine) to forgo a military response to the initial Russian assault and instead quietly allow Russia to take control of its eastern cities.

From another viewpoint, however, Russia would not have been in a position to try to impose its will on Ukraine and the West if Germany had not surrendered its nuclear power plants to the green agenda and if President Biden had not shuttered the Keystone pipeline and waged regulatory war against the fossil fuel industry that has kept the West free.

Similarly, Hamas would not have had the weaponry to mount its ongoing assaults had the West not welcomed the trade in sanctioned Russian, Venezuelan, and Iranian oil. The U.S. had been poised to profit from a booming oil market, but the Biden policy of phasing out U.S. oil and gas production opened the door for massive profits for rogue nations.

Green goals, it turns out, have fueled the fires of war and left the West awkwardly needing fossil fuel energy more than ever while publicly declaring fossil fuel energy as the greatest threat to humanity, dwarfing even an increasingly likely nuclear holocaust.

But then again, those who claim that fossil fuels inspired an artificial prosperity built on slowly destroying the planet may prefer a post-nuclear world without electricity and without the great majority of Earth’s current population.

Climate Loss and Damage Fails Again

A crucial meeting on climate “loss and damages” ahead of COP28 ended in failure Saturday, with countries from the global north and south unable to reach an agreement, according to sources involved in the talks. The agreement to set up a dedicated fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate “loss and damage” was a flagship achievement of last year’s COP27 talks in Egypt. 

From Science Matters

by Ron Clutz

The big news this week is the  breakdown of Climate “Loss and Damge” talks in preparation for the Dubai COP to start end of November.  The news report is repeated widely with the same headline and content. Example from Jakarta Post, Oct. 21, 2023:  Climate ‘loss and damage’ talks end in failure

A crucial meeting on climate “loss and damages” ahead of COP28 ended in failure Saturday, with countries from the global north and south unable to reach an agreement, according to sources involved in the talks. The agreement to set up a dedicated fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate “loss and damage” was a flagship achievement of last year’s COP27 talks in Egypt.

But countries left the details to be worked out later. A series of talks held this year have tried to tease out consensus on fundamentals like the structure, beneficiaries and contributors — a key issue for richer nations who want China to pay into the fund.

The failure “is a clear indication of the deep chasm between rich and poor nations”, Harjeet Singh, head of global political strategy for Climate Action Network International, said in a statement to AFP on Saturday. “Developed countries must be held accountable for their shameless attempts to push the World Bank as the host of the fund, their refusal to discuss the necessary scale of finance, and their blatant disregard for their responsibilities” under the terms of already established international climate agreements, he said.

More in depth reporting comes from Climate Home News article World Bank controversy sends loss and damage talks into overtime

At Cop27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, governments tasked the committee with working out what a new loss and damage fund for climate victims should look like and present their proposals to Cop28 in November.

The fund is supposed to channel money to people who have suffered
loss and damage caused by climate change. This could mean rebuilding homes
after a hurricane or supporting farmers displaced by recurrent drought.
Failure to reach consensus risks delaying support to those in need.

But developing countries were incensed by a proposal to host the fund at the World Bank, painting it as a US power grab. And rich-poor divides persisted on how to define the “vulnerable” groups eligible for funds and who gets to control spending.

Pedro Luis Pedroso Cuesta is a Cuban diplomat and chair of the G77+China bloc, which represents all the developing countries.

Speaking from Aswan, he told reporters on Thursday: “At this late hour, a small group of nations responsible for the most significant proportion of the stock of greenhouse gases have tried to bargain potential support for a Fund on one side with eligibility and administrative arrangements.”

Developing nations have argued that the World bank is too slow, inefficient,
unaccountable and lacks the organisational culture to tackle climate change.

He said that consultations with the Washington-DC based bank had “displayed clearly” that it was “not fit for purpose in relation to what we’re looking for” and the fund should be set up as part of the United Nations instead.

Who benefits?

The second main division is over which countries are prioritised for funding. Developed countries want the funds to be allocated “based on vulnerability”.

There is no clear definition of vulnerability and Cuesta said this criteria would impede the fund’s ability to respond to recent climate-related floods in middle-income countries like Pakistan and Libya.

Developing countries fear that in practice “vulnerability” criteria mean funds will be restricted to just the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) and small islands developing states (Sids).

The 46 LDCS are mostly in Africa and parts of Asia. Major nations like
China, India, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa are neither LDCs or Sids.

Further splits include developing nations wanting a target of $100 billion of funding a year by 2030 to be included and developed countries wanting to earmark budgets for slow onset events, recovery and reconstruction and small countries.

Negotiators have almost agreed one thorny issue though. The US had pushed for the fund’s board to include seats for nations that paid into the fund, sparking accusations that they were trying to rig the board in rich nations’ favour.

Friday morning’s draft said there would be 12 board members from developed countries and 14 from developing ones. There could also be non-voting members representing indigenous peoples and climate-induced migrants, although negotiators have yet to agree that.

Climate Loss and Damage is a Legal and Moral House of Cards

Mike Hulme explained the house of cards underlying the claims for compensation from extreme weather loss and damage.  He addressed this directly in his 2016 article Can (and Should) “Loss and Damage” be Attributed to Climate Change?.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

One of the outcomes of the eighteenth negotiating session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Doha last December, was the agreement to establish institutional arrangements to “address loss and damage associated with the impacts of climate change.” This opens up new possibilities for allocating international climate adaptation finance to developing countries. A meeting this week in Bonn (25–27 February), co-organized by the UN University Institute for Environmental and Human Security and the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, is bringing together various scholars and policymakers to consider how this decision might be implemented, possibly by as early as 2015.

At the heart of the loss and damage (L&D) agenda is the idea of attribution—that specific losses and damages in developing countries can be “associated with the impacts of climate change,” where “climate change” means human-caused alterations to climate. It is therefore not just any L&D that qualify for financial assistance under the Convention; it is L&D attributable to or “associated with” a very specific causal pathway.

Developing countries face some serious difficulties—at best, ambiguities—
with this approach to directing climate adaptation finance.

This is particularly so given the argument that the new science of weather attribution opens the possibility for a framework of legal liability for L&D, which has recently gained prominence (see here and here). Weather attribution science seeks to generate model-based estimates of the likelihood that human influence on the climate caused specific weather extremes.

Weather attribution should not, however, be used to make the funding of climate adaptation in developing countries dependent on proving liability for weather extremes.

There are four specific problems with using the post-Doha negotiations on L&D to advance the legal liability paradigm for climate adaptation. First, with what level of confidence can it be shown that specific weather or climate hazards in particular places are caused by anthropogenic climate change, as opposed to a naturally varying climate? Weather attribution scientists claim that such knowledge is achievable, but this knowledge will be partial, probabilistic, and open to contestation in the courts.

Second, even if such scientific claims were defendable, how will we define “anthropogenic?” Weather attribution science—if it is to be used to support a legal liability paradigm—needs to be capable of distinguishing between the meteorological effects of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and those from land use change, and between the effects of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, black carbon (soot), and aerosol emissions. Each of these sources and types of climate-altering agents implicates different social and political actors and interests, so to establish liability in the courts, any given weather or climate hazard would need to be broken down into a profile of multiple fractional attributions. This adds a further layer of complexity and contestation to the approach.

Third, L&D may often be as much—or more—a function of levels of social and infrastructural development as it is a function of weather or climate hazard. Whether or not an atmospheric hazard is (partially) attributable to a liable human actor or institution is hardly the determining factor on the extent of the L&D. A legal liability framework based on attribution science promotes a “pollutionist approach” to climate adaptation and human welfare rather than a “developmentalist approach.” Under a pollutionist approach, adaptation is primarily about avoiding the dangers of human-induced climate change rather than building human resilience to a range of weather risks irrespective of cause. This approach has very specific political ramifications, serving some interests rather than others (e.g., technocratic and centralized control of adaptation funding over values-centered and decentralized control).

Finally, if such a legal framework were to be adopted, then what account should be taken of “gains and benefits” that might accrue to developing countries as a result of the impacts of climate change? Not all changes in weather and climate hazard as a result of human influence are detrimental to human welfare, and the principle of symmetry would demand that a full cost-benefit analysis lie at the heart of such a legal framework. This introduces another tier of complexity and contestation.

Following Doha and the COP18, the loss and damage agenda now has institutional force, and the coming months and years will see rounds of technical and political negotiation about how it may be put into operation. This agenda, however, should not place climate adaptation funding into the framework of legal liability backed by the new science of weather attribution.

Hulme goes more deeply into the Loss and Damage difficulties in his 2014 paper Attributing Weather Extremes to ‘Climate Change’: a Review.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds.

In this third and final review I survey the nascent science of extreme weather event attribution. The article proceeds by examining the field in four stages: motivations for extreme weather attribution, methods of attribution, some example case studies and the politics of weather event Attribution.

Hulme concludes by discussing the political hunger for scientific proof in support of policy actions.

But Hulme et al. (2011) show why such ambitious claims are unlikely to be realised. Investment in climate adaptation, they claim, is most needed “… where vulnerability to meteorological hazard is high, not where meteorological hazards are most attributable to human influence” (p.765). Extreme weather attribution says nothing about how damages are attributable to meteorological hazard as opposed to exposure to risk; it says nothing about the complex political, social and economic structures which mediate physical hazards.

And separating weather into two categories — ‘human-caused’ weather
and ‘tough-luck’ weather – raises practical and ethical concerns about
any subsequent investment allocation guidelines which excluded
the victims of ‘tough-luck weather’ from benefiting from adaptation funds.

Synopsis of this paper is at X-Weathermen are Back!

Integrated Storm Activity Annually over the Continental U.S. (ISAAC)